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Ownership concentration in Russian industry

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  • Sergei Guriev

    ()
    (New Economic School/CEFIR and CERP)

  • Andrei Rachinsky

    ()
    (CEFIR)

Abstract

Using a unique dataset built for the World Bank’s Country Economic Memorandum, we find that a relatively small number of tycoons ('oligarchs') control a substantial share of Russia’s economy. Oligarchs seem to run their empires more efficiently than other Russian owners. While the relative weight of their firms in Russian economy is huge, they do not seem to be excessively large by the standards of the global economy where most of them are operating. However, a majority of the Russian population deems their property rights illegitimate, which creates a fundamental problem for building a democratic and prosperous Russia.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0045.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0045

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References

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  6. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2537-2564, December.
  7. Edward M. Graham, 2003. "Reforming Korea's Industrial Conglomerates," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 341, July.
  8. Krishna B. Kumar & Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1999. "What Determines Firm Size?," NBER Working Papers 7208, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Roger Myerson & Serguey Braguinsky, 2005. "Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment," 2005 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 49, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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  11. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Haaparanta, Pertti & Juurikkala, Tuuli & Lazareva, Olga & Pirttilä, Jukka & Solanko, Laura & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2003. "Firms and public service provision in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition 16/2003, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  2. Aidis, Ruta & Adachi, Yuko, 2007. "Russia: Firm entry and survival barriers," Economic Systems, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 391-411, December.
  3. Ichiro Iwasaki, 2007. "Enterprise Reform And Corporate Governance In Russia: A Quantitative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(5), pages 849-902, December.
  4. Estrin, Saul & Prevezer, Martha, 2010. "A survey on institutions and new firm entry: How and why do entry rates differ in emerging markets?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 289-308, September.
  5. Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Treisman, 2005. "A Normal Country: Russia After Communism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 151-174, Winter.
  6. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2005. "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 131-150, Winter.
  7. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2007. "A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia," Working Papers, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) w0103, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

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