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Reduction of Asymmetric Information through Corporate Governance Mechanisms : The Importance of Ownership Dispersion and International

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Author Info
Holm, Claus () (Department of Business Studies, Aarhus School of Business)
Schøler, Finn (Department of Business Studies, Aarhus School of Business)
Abstract

Research Question/Issue: Is the reduction of asymmetric information through Corporate Governance mechanisms more important for some listed companies than for others? The purpose of this study is to examine how differences in "ownership dispersion" and "international orientation" affect the particular use of the Corporate Governance mechanisms "transparency" and "board independence" in listed companies.

Research Findings/Insights: Our findings are based on a Danish dataset which includes 100 listed companies. We find that transparency is a more important Corporate Governance mechanism for companies with an international orientation, while differences in ownership dispersion do not affect the use of this mechanism. In contrast, we find that board independence is a more important Corporate Governance mechanism for companies with dispersed ownership while international orientation has less importance.

Theoretical/Academic Implications: The study contributes to an improved understanding of the circumstantial relationship between good Corporate Governance and good corporate performance. This is important in order to interpret differences in prior research findings and provide insight for the design of future studies of the seemingly endogenous nature of many Corporate Governance relationships.

Practitioner/Policy Implications: The requirement to adhere to the "comply or explain rules" for Corporate Governance has become commonplace for listed companies. The study provides insight into valid reasons for differences in compliance. Regulators and other capital market participants should acknowledge that companies may differ in their use of Corporate Governance mechanisms for various reasons, including differences in ownership dispersion and international orientation

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File URL: http://research.asb.dk/fbspretrieve/2862/A-2008-02
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Business Studies in its series Accounting Research Center Working Papers with number A-2008-02.

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Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: 05 Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhb:aarbac:2008-02

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Postal: The Aarhus School of Business, Fuglesangs Allé 4, DK-8210 Aarhus V, Denmark
Fax: + 45 86 15 19 43
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/about/departments/bs.aspx
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Related research
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Transparency; Board Member Independence; Two Tier Board Structure; Ownership Dispersion; Internationalisation;

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  1. Oxelheim, Lars & Randoy, Trond, 2003. "The impact of foreign board membership on firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(12), pages 2369-2392, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Anderson, Ronald C. & Mansi, Sattar A. & Reeb, David M., 2004. "Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 315-342, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Holger Daske, 2006. "Economic Benefits of Adopting IFRS or US-GAAP - Have the Expected Cost of Equity Capital Really Decreased?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(3-4), pages 329-373. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Brunello, Giorgio & Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno, 2001. "Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 133-161, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. K. J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, 2005. "Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2859-2894, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eng, L. L. & Mak, Y. T., 2003. "Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 325-345. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Christine A. Botosan, 2002. "A Re-examination of Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity Capital," Journal of Accounting Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(1), pages 21-40, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Berger, Allen N. & Clarke, George R. G. & Cull, Robert & Klapper, Leora & Udell, Gregory F., 2005. "Corporate governance and bank performance : a joint analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3632, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Cohen, Alma, 2005. "The costs of entrenched boards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 409-433, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. M. Gietzmann & J. Ireland, 2005. "Cost of Capital, Strategic Disclosures and Accounting Choice," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3-4), pages 599-634. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Thomas Clarke, 2004. "Cycles of Crisis and Regulation: the enduring agency and stewardship problems of corporate governance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(2), pages 153-161, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Chi-Kun Ho, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Corporate Competitiveness: an international analysis," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(2), pages 211-253, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Brown, Lawrence D. & Caylor, Marcus L., 2006. "Corporate governance and firm valuation," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 409-434. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, 2006. "Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 655-687, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gani, Lindawati & Jermias, Johnny, 2006. "Investigating the effect of board independence on performance across different strategies," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 295-314. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Krivogorsky, Victoria, 2006. "Ownership, board structure, and performance in continental Europe," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 176-197. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Niamh Brennan, 2006. "Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: is there an expectations gap?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(6), pages 577-593, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Seifert, Bruce & Gonenc, Halit & Wright, Jim, 2005. "The international evidence on performance and equity ownership by insiders, blockholders, and institutions," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 171-191, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Roszaini Haniffa & Mohammad Hudaib, 2006. "Corporate Governance Structure and Performance of Malaysian Listed Companies," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(7-8), pages 1034-1062. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Chua, Choong Tze & Eun, Cheol S. & Lai, Sandy, 2007. "Corporate valuation around the world: The effects of governance, growth, and openness," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 35-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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