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Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts

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  • Susanna Gallani

    (Harvard Business School, Accounting and Management Unit)

Abstract

Effective design of executive compensation contracts involves choosing and weighting performance measures, as well as defining the mix between fixed and incentive-based pay components, with a view to fostering talent retention and goal congruence. The variability in compensation design observed in practice is significantly lower than it would be predicted by contracting theory. This is likely due to indirect constraining pressures, which cannot be completely explained by industry affiliation or peer group membership. I posit that network connections involving corporate boards operate as a conduit for these pressures. Using information disclosed in proxy statements of publicly traded companies, and a vectorial approach to measure compensation similarity, I predict and find that firms that are connected by board interlocks, hiring the same compensation consulting firm, or sharing a blockholder, exhibit a higher degree of similarity in the design of executive compensation contracts than what would be predicted by similarities in organizational characteristics. The relative prominence of the connectors within the respective networks moderates the network effects on the degree of compensation similarity. Finally, I show that the market responds positively to compensation similarity, although it is associated with excess CEO compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Susanna Gallani, 2015. "Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-019, Harvard Business School, revised Dec 2016.
    • Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Melvin Jameson & Tao‐Hsien Dolly King & Andrew Prevost, 2021. "Top management incentives and financial flexibility: The case of make‐whole call provisions," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1-2), pages 374-404, January.
    2. Christie Hayne & Marshall Vance, 2019. "Information Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter? Field Evidence on the Indirect and Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 969-1011, September.

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    Keywords

    Compensation design; Board interlocks; Compensation consultants; Blockholders; Network centrality.;
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