Fair Apportionment in the View of the Venice Commission's Recommendation
AbstractIn this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size of any constituency not to differ from the average constituency size by more than a fixed limit. We show that this minimum difference constraint, while attractive per definition, is not compatible with monotonicity and Hare-quota properties, two standard requirements of apportionment rules. We present an algorithm that efficiently finds an allotment such that the differences from the average district size are lexicographically minimized. This apportionment rule is a well-defined allocation mechanism compatible with and derived from the recommendation of the Venice Commission. Finally, we compare this apportionment rule with mainstream mechanisms using real data from Hungary and the United States.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 1338.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2013
Date of revision:
Apportionment; voting; elections; Venice Commission; proportionality; lexicographic ordering;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-11-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-11-09 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kóczy Á., László & Biró, Péter & Sziklai, Balázs, 2012.
[Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1165-1186.
- Demange, Gabrielle, 2012.
"On party-proportional representation under district distortions,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 181-191.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2011. "On party-proportional representation under district distortions," PSE Working Papers halshs-00623031, HAL.
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