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Fair Apportionment in the View of the Venice Commission's Recommendation

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  • Peter Biro

    ()
    (Momentum Game Theory Research Group, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies)

  • Laszlo A. Koczy

    ()
    (Momentum Game Theory Research Group, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies)

  • Balazs Sziklai

    ()
    (Momentum Game Theory Research Group, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size of any constituency not to differ from the average constituency size by more than a fixed limit. We show that this minimum difference constraint, while attractive per definition, is not compatible with monotonicity and Hare-quota properties, two standard requirements of apportionment rules. We present an algorithm that efficiently finds an allotment such that the differences from the average district size are lexicographically minimized. This apportionment rule is a well-defined allocation mechanism compatible with and derived from the recommendation of the Venice Commission. Finally, we compare this apportionment rule with mainstream mechanisms using real data from Hungary and the United States.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 1338.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1338

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Keywords: Apportionment; voting; elections; Venice Commission; proportionality; lexicographic ordering;

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  1. Kóczy Á., László & Biró, Péter & Sziklai, Balázs, 2012. "Választókörzetek igazságosan?
    [Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1165-1186.
  2. Gabrielle Demange, 2011. "On party-proportional representation under district distortions," PSE Working Papers halshs-00623031, HAL.
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