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Optimal Apportionment

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Author Info

  • Yukio Koriyama

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Antonin Macé

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Rafael Treibich

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical foundation which supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems. The core of the argument is that each individual derives utility from the fact that the collective decision matches her own will with some frequency, with marginal utility decreasing with respect to this frequency. Then classical utilitarianism at the social level recommends decision rules which exhibit degressive proportionality. The model is applied to the case of the 27 states of the European Union.

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File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/66/78/52/PDF/cahier_de_recherche_2012-1.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00667852.

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Date of creation: 08 Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00667852

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00667852
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Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: Apportionment problem; Two-tier voting system; Simple games;

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References

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  1. Jean-François Laslier, 2011. "Why not proportional?," Working Papers hal-00625308, HAL.
  2. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
  3. Laruelle,Annick & Valenciano,Federico, 2011. "Voting and Collective Decision-Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521182638, Fall.
  4. Felsenthal, Dan S. & Machover, Moshe, 1999. "Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 25-37, January.
  5. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Bafumi, Joseph, 2002. "Standard Voting Power Indexes Don't Work: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 1133, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  6. Macé, Antonin & Treibich, Rafael, 2012. "Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 141-151.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Laslier, Jean-François, 2012. "Why not proportional?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 90-93.
  2. Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel & and Matthias Weber, 2014. "Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-058/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. Matthias Weber, 2014. "Choosing Voting Systems behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-042/I, Tinbergen Institute.

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