Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions
AbstractWhile they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the in-dices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 0820.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Banzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; rational players;
Other versions of this item:
- Kóczy, László Á., 2006. "Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions," Research Memoranda 049, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2006. "Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions," Working Paper Series 0803, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management, revised May 2008.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-11-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2008-11-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2008-11-18 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Kóczy, László Á., 2012. "Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 152-158.
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