IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/psewpa/halshs-01826330.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Fuel Tax Decomposition When Local Pollution Matters

Author

Listed:
  • Stéphane Gauthier

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Fanny Henriet

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

We study the optimal design of consumption taxes when both global and local externalities matter. Local externalities make the social impact of the consumption of externality-generating commodities varying across consumers. A typical example involves the greater damage caused by pollution from urban fuel consumers. We provide a condition for the validity of the targeting principle according to which externality concerns should only fall on the taxes on externality-generating commodities. When this condition is satisfied, one can decompose the tax on an externality-generating commodity into equity/efficiency and Pigovian contributions. The Pigovian contribution should exceed the average social damage if the fuel consumption of the greatest polluters is more responsive to fuel price. In an empirical illustration we find that the fuel tax in France is mostly explained by Pigovian considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Gauthier & Fanny Henriet, 2018. "A Fuel Tax Decomposition When Local Pollution Matters," PSE Working Papers halshs-01826330, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01826330
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01826330
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01826330/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James M. Poterba, 1991. "Is the Gasoline Tax Regressive?," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 5, pages 145-164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. A. Lans Bovenberg & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2002. "Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market in a Second-Best World," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 6, pages 112-153, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Rainald Borck & Jan K. Brueckner, 2018. "Optimal Energy Taxation in Cities," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 481-516.
    4. Janet Currie & Joshua Graff Zivin & Jamie Mullins & Matthew Neidell, 2014. "What Do We Know About Short- and Long-Term Effects of Early-Life Exposure to Pollution?," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 217-247, October.
    5. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I--Production Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 8-27, March.
    6. Lucas W. Davis, 2014. "The Economic Cost of Global Fuel Subsidies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 581-585, May.
    7. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz & Ladoux, Norbert, 2003. "Environmental taxes with heterogeneous consumers: an application to energy consumption in France," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2791-2815, December.
    8. Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, 2002. "Externalities and Optimal Taxation," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 14, pages 210-232, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Peter A. Diamond, 1973. "Consumption Externalities and Imperfect Corrective Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(2), pages 526-538, Autumn.
    10. Eckerstorfer, Paul & Wendner, Ronald, 2013. "Asymmetric and non-atmospheric consumption externalities, and efficient consumption taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 42-56.
    11. Williams III, Roberton C., 2003. "Health effects and optimal environmental taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 323-335, February.
    12. Sandmo, Agnar, 2011. "Atmospheric externalities and environmental taxation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(S1), pages 4-12.
    13. Ian W. H. Parry & Kenneth A. Small, 2005. "Does Britain or the United States Have the Right Gasoline Tax?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1276-1289, September.
    14. Raven Molloy & Hui Shan, 2013. "The Effect of Gasoline Prices on Household Location," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(4), pages 1212-1221, October.
    15. Ronald Wendner, 2014. "Ramsey, Pigou, Heterogeneous Agents, and Nonatmospheric Consumption Externalities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 491-521, June.
    16. Véronique Nichèle & Jean-Marc Robin, 1993. "Évaluation des effets budgétaires et redistributifs de réformes de la fiscalité indirecte française," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 110(4), pages 105-128.
    17. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-278, June.
    18. Fu, Shihe & Gu, Yizhen, 2017. "Highway toll and air pollution: Evidence from Chinese cities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 32-49.
    19. Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2016. "Generalized Social Marginal Welfare Weights for Optimal Tax Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(1), pages 24-45, January.
    20. West, Sarah E. & Williams III, Roberton C., 2007. "Optimal taxation and cross-price effects on labor supply: Estimates of the optimal gas tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 593-617, April.
    21. Rachel Griffith & Martin O'Connell & Kate Smith, 2017. "Design of optimal corrective taxes in the alcohol market," IFS Working Papers W17/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    22. West, Sarah E., 2004. "Distributional effects of alternative vehicle pollution control policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 735-757, March.
    23. William A. Barnett & Ousmane Seck, 2008. "Rotterdam model versus almost ideal demand system: will the best specification please stand up?," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(6), pages 795-824.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stéphane Gauthier & Fanny Henriet, 2018. "A Fuel Tax Decomposition When Local Pollution Matters," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01826330, HAL.
    2. Stéphane Gauthier & Fanny Henriet, 2023. "Targeting Taxes on Local Externalities," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 151, pages 1-36.
    3. Jacobs, Bas & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2019. "Redistribution and pollution taxes with non-linear Engel curves," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 198-226.
    4. Bas (B.) Jacobs & Rick (F.) van der Ploeg, 2017. "Should Pollution Taxes Be Targeted At Income Redistribution?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-070/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Tscharaktschiew, Stefan, 2014. "Shedding light on the appropriateness of the (high) gasoline tax level in Germany," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-210.
    6. Alberto Gago & Xavier Labandeira & Xiral López Otero, 2014. "A Panorama on Energy Taxes and Green Tax Reforms," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 208(1), pages 145-190, March.
    7. James M. Sallee, 2019. "Pigou Creates Losers: On the Implausibility of Achieving Pareto Improvements from Efficiency-Enhancing Policies," NBER Working Papers 25831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Rezai, Armon & Tovar Reanos, Miguel, 2022. "Gathering support for green tax reform: Evidence from German household surveys," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    9. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz & Ladoux, Norbert, 2010. "Environmental tax design with endogenous earning abilities (with applications to France)," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 82-93, January.
    10. Antón-Sarabia, Arturo & Hernández-Trillo, Fausto, 2014. "Optimal gasoline tax in developing, oil-producing countries: The case of Mexico," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 564-571.
    11. Jacobs, Bas & de Mooij, Ruud A., 2015. "Pigou meets Mirrlees: On the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second-best Pigouvian tax," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 90-108.
    12. Abrell, Jan & Rausch, Sebastian & Schwarz, Giacomo A., 2018. "How robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 783-814.
    13. Heider, Florian & Inderst, Roman, 2021. "A Corporate Finance Perspective on Environmental Policy," EconStor Preprints 253669, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    14. Lawrence Goulder, 2007. "Distributional and Efficiency Impacts of Increased U.S. Gasoline Taxes," Discussion Papers 07-009, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    15. Hänsel, Martin C. & Franks, Max & Kalkuhl, Matthias & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2022. "Optimal carbon taxation and horizontal equity: A welfare-theoretic approach with application to German household data," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    16. Parry, Ian W.H. & Sigman, Hilary & Walls, Margaret & Williams, Roberton C., III, 2005. "The Incidence of Pollution Control Policies," Discussion Papers 10651, Resources for the Future.
    17. Silvia Tiezzi & Stefano F. Verde, 2017. "The signaling effect of gasoline taxes and its distributional implications," RSCAS Working Papers 2017/06, European University Institute.
    18. Lucas W. Davis & James M. Sallee, 2020. "Should Electric Vehicle Drivers Pay a Mileage Tax?," Environmental and Energy Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 65-94.
    19. Hoel, Michael, 2008. "Environmental Taxes in an Economy with Distorting Taxes and a Heterogeneous Population," Memorandum 04/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    20. Philippe Bontems & Estelle Gozlan, 2018. "Trade, environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(4), pages 557-581, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pigovian tax; targeting principle; local externality; pollution; commodity taxes;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01826330. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.