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Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia (eds), Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 535 pages, ISBN 978-110744698-4

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  • Maurice Salles

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

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  • Maurice Salles, 2017. "Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia (eds), Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 535 pages, ISBN 978-110744698-4," Post-Print halshs-02084709, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02084709
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02084709
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Young, H. P., 1977. "Extending Condorcet's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 335-353, December.
    2. Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), 2015. "Handbook of Social Choice and Voting," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15584.
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