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Je Ne Veux Pas Faire Ou Je Ne Peux Pas Faire ? Apports Epistemologiques Et Methodologiques De La Philosophie De Paul Ricoeur A La Critique Du Concept D'Agence

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  • Alexander Niess

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

La théorie des incitations, rapprochée de la théorie de l'agence dans le champ comptable, comprend deux grandes dimensions, le vouloir agir et le pouvoir agir, mais cette dernière composante n'a été que très peu analysée. Les travaux de Paul Ricoeur permettent de montrer qu'en s'intéressant exclusivement aux incitations comme un correctif de la (mauvaise) volonté des agents, la théorie de l'agence nie la capacité d'agir de ceux-ci et risque ainsi de favoriser des dispositifs de gestion qui augmentent l'incapacité. Pour répondre au défi méthodologique posé par cette nouvelle perspective, nous présentons la théorie des construits personnels et la technique du repertory grid élaborées par George Kelly.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Niess, 2007. "Je Ne Veux Pas Faire Ou Je Ne Peux Pas Faire ? Apports Epistemologiques Et Methodologiques De La Philosophie De Paul Ricoeur A La Critique Du Concept D'Agence," Post-Print halshs-00544961, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00544961
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00544961
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    References listed on IDEAS

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