IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-03948379.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Stock-options: an efficient tool to fight R&D managerial short-termism ?
[L’attribution de stock-options : un outil efficace de lutte contre le court-termisme managérial en matière de R&D ?]

Author

Listed:
  • Guillaume Dumas

    (UM - Université de Montpellier)

  • Alexandre Di Giacomo
  • Quentin Arnaud

Abstract

La littérature montre que l'attribution de stock-options oriente les actions des dirigeants vers la création de valeur à long terme ce qui favorise l'investissement en R&D. Nous nous demandons si ce mécanisme fonctionne même lorsque le dirigeant a des incitations au court-termisme (ici atteindre des seuils de résultat). Ne pas atteindre un seuil peut être perçu négativement par les investisseurs, ce qui peut conduire à une chute du cours boursier. Notre échantillon est composé d'entreprises françaises issues du SBF 120 investissant en R&D sur la période 2009‑2015. Les résultats montrent l'influence ambivalente des stock-options sur l'investissement en R&D. Attribuer des stock-options favorise l'investissement en R&D uniquement lorsque le dirigeant n'a pas d'incitation à réduire les dépenses de R&D pour atteindre les seuils de résultat sur le court terme. En revanche, si le dirigeant est en situation de ne pas atteindre le seuil, les stock-options l'incitent à réduire les dépenses de R&D. En effet, manquer les seuils, fait baisser le cours boursier et donc le montant de rémunération issue des stock-options que pourrait percevoir le dirigeant. La principale contribution de notre travail est de montrer que les incitations subies par les dirigeants, pour agir de manière court-termiste, modifient l'efficacité des mécanismes de rémunération en tant qu'outil de gouvernance supposé orienter les décisions des dirigeants vers l'investissement de long terme.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Dumas & Alexandre Di Giacomo & Quentin Arnaud, 2021. "Stock-options: an efficient tool to fight R&D managerial short-termism ? [L’attribution de stock-options : un outil efficace de lutte contre le court-termisme managérial en matière de R&D ?]," Post-Print hal-03948379, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03948379
    DOI: 10.4000/fcs.7603
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-03948379
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-03948379/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.4000/fcs.7603?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Marginson & Laurie McAulay, 2008. "Exploring the debate on short‐termism: a theoretical and empirical analysis," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 273-292, March.
    2. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    3. Alex Edmans, 2009. "Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(6), pages 2481-2513, December.
    4. Tsao, Shou-Min & Lin, Che-Hung & Chen, Vincent Y.S., 2015. "Family ownership as a moderator between R&D investments and CEO compensation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 599-606.
    5. DeFusco, Richard A & Johnson, Robert R & Zorn, Thomas S, 1990. "The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 617-627, June.
    6. Filippo Belloc, 2012. "Corporate Governance And Innovation: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(5), pages 835-864, December.
    7. Mohamed Khenissi & Vanessa Serret, 2019. "Le pouvoir des médias comme mécanisme de gouvernance sur la rémunération des dirigeants des sociétés de l’indice boursier SBF 120," Post-Print hal-02428132, HAL.
    8. Dechow, Patricia M. & Sloan, Richard G., 1991. "Executive incentives and the horizon problem : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 51-89, March.
    9. Degeorge, Francois & Patel, Jayendu & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1999. "Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(1), pages 1-33, January.
    10. Anderson, Ronald C. & Duru, Augustine & Reeb, David M., 2012. "Investment policy in family controlled firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1744-1758.
    11. Yuval Deutsch, 2007. "The Influence of Outside Directors' Stock‐Option Compensation on Firms' R&D," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 816-827, September.
    12. Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R. & Rajgopal, Shiva, 2005. "The economic implications of corporate financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 3-73, December.
    13. Lundstrum, Leonard L., 2002. "Corporate investment myopia: a horserace of the theories," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 353-371, October.
    14. Jouahn Nam & Richard E. Ottoo & John H. Thornton Jr., 2003. "The Effect of Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk on Corporate Capital Structure and R&D Investment," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-101, February.
    15. Zona, Fabio, 2016. "Agency models in different stages of CEO tenure: The effects of stock options and board independence on R&D investment," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 560-575.
    16. Jennifer J. Gaver & Kenneth M. Gaver, 1995. "Compensation Policy and the Investment Opportunity Set," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 24(1), Spring.
    17. Ali, Ashiq & Zhang, Weining, 2015. "CEO tenure and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 60-79.
    18. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    19. Guillaume Dumas, 2017. "Gestion processuelle des résultats : une étude des dépenses de R&D des entreprises françaises cotées," ACCRA, Association francophone de comptabilité, vol. 23(2), pages 111-141.
    20. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Phillip J. Quinn, 2018. "Shifting corporate culture: executive stock ownership plan adoptions and incentives to meet or just beat analysts’ expectations," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 654-685, June.
    2. Alexandre Di Giacomo & Pascal Alphonse, 2014. "Incitants Financiers Du Dirigeant Et Niveau D'Endettement Optimal," Post-Print hal-01899182, HAL.
    3. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    4. Gormley, Todd A. & Matsa, David A. & Milbourn, Todd, 2013. "CEO compensation and corporate risk: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 79-101.
    5. Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Ferreira, Daniel & Goh, Lisa, 2022. "Changes in CEO stock option grants: A look at the numbers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    6. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2012. "Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 70-88.
    7. Jian Wang & Yanhuang Huang & Hongrui Feng & Xingjian Li & Shu Yan, 2023. "CEO incentive compensation and stock price momentum," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(S1), pages 975-1028, April.
    8. Chava, Sudheer & Purnanandam, Amiyatosh, 2010. "CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 263-278, August.
    9. Brennan, Michael J. & Kraft, Holger, 2016. "Leaning against the wind: Debt financing in the face of adversity," SAFE Working Paper Series 119, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, revised 2016.
    10. Lewellen, Katharina, 2006. "Financing decisions when managers are risk averse," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 551-589, December.
    11. Yermack, David, 1995. "Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2-3), pages 237-269.
    12. Peter Cziraki & Moqi Xu, 2014. "Ceo Job Security And Risk-Taking," FMG Discussion Papers dp729, Financial Markets Group.
    13. Burney, Robert B. & James, Hui Liang & Wang, Hongxia, 2021. "Working capital management and CEO age," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C).
    14. Garel, Alexandre & Martin-Flores, Jose M. & Petit-Romec, Arthur & Scott, Ayesha, 2021. "Institutional investor distraction and earnings management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    15. Li, Zhaochu & Lytvynenko, Iryna P. & Philippoff, Karl S., 2021. "Stock market reactions to R&D cuts used to manage earnings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    16. Ryan, Harley Jr. & Wiggins, Roy III, 2001. "The influence of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 101-123, June.
    17. Charlotte L. Schuster & Alexander T. Nicolai & Jeffrey G. Covin, 2020. "Are Founder-Led Firms Less Susceptible to Managerial Myopia?," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 44(3), pages 391-421, May.
    18. Ahmad Hammami & Mohammad Hendijani Zadeh, 2022. "Predicting earnings management through machine learning ensemble classifiers," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(8), pages 1639-1660, December.
    19. Ghaly, Mohamed & Dang, Viet Anh & Stathopoulos, Konstantinos, 2020. "Institutional investors' horizons and corporate employment decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    20. Xin Qu & Majella Percy & Fang Hu & Jenny Stewart, 2022. "Can CEO equity‐based compensation limit investment‐related agency problems?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2579-2614, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03948379. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.