IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01899182.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Incitants Financiers Du Dirigeant Et Niveau D'Endettement Optimal

Author

Listed:
  • Alexandre Di Giacomo

    (LSMRC - Lille School of Management Research Center - ULR 4112 - SKEMA Business School - Université de Lille)

  • Pascal Alphonse

    (European Center of Corporate Control Studies - LSMRC - PRES Université Lille Nord de France)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the link between incentive mix and financing policy. We focus on the conditional effect of pay to performance sensitivity on risk taking behavior. We focus on target debt leverage level determinants using a dynamic adjustment model. We consider US firms to validate our hypothesis on the period 1992-2005. Our data are extracted from Compustat and Execucomp database. The main result of this work is that the efficiency of risk incentive is highly dependent of CEO's performance incentive reaching a given threshold.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexandre Di Giacomo & Pascal Alphonse, 2014. "Incitants Financiers Du Dirigeant Et Niveau D'Endettement Optimal," Post-Print hal-01899182, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01899182
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01899182
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-01899182/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ivo Welch, 2004. "Capital Structure and Stock Returns," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(1), pages 106-131, February.
    2. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    3. Dirk Brounen & Abe de Jong & Kees Koedijk, 2004. "Corporate Finance in Europe: Confronting Theory with Practice," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 33(4), Winter.
    4. Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug, 2007. "Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 303-343, February.
    5. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    6. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
    7. Wolfgang Drobetz & Gabrielle Wanzenried, 2006. "What determines the speed of adjustment to the target capital structure?," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(13), pages 941-958.
    8. Michael Kremer & Edward Miguel & Rebecca Thornton, 2009. "Incentives to Learn," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(3), pages 437-456, August.
    9. Jouahn Nam & Richard E. Ottoo & John H. Thornton Jr., 2003. "The Effect of Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk on Corporate Capital Structure and R&D Investment," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-101, February.
    10. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Jennifer N. Carpenter, 2000. "Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 2311-2331, October.
    12. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    13. Taggart, Robert A, Jr, 1977. "A Model of Corporate Financing Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(5), pages 1467-1484, December.
    14. Flannery, Mark J. & Rangan, Kasturi P., 2006. "Partial adjustment toward target capital structures," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 469-506, March.
    15. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
    16. Jennifer Carpenter, 1999. "Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-076, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    17. Aydin Ozkan, 2001. "Determinants of Capital Structure and Adjustment to Long Run Target: Evidence From UK Company Panel Data," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1‐2), pages 175-198, January.
    18. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    19. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    20. Lambert, Ra & Larcker, Df & Verrecchia, Re, 1991. "Portfolio Considerations In Valuing Executive-Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 129-149.
    21. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    22. Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, 2002. "Market Timing and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 1-32, February.
    23. Kraus, Alan & Litzenberger, Robert H, 1973. "A State-Preference Model of Optimal Financial Leverage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 28(4), pages 911-922, September.
    24. Rogers, Daniel A., 2002. "Does executive portfolio structure affect risk management? CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate derivatives usage," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(2-3), pages 271-295, March.
    25. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    26. Brounen, D. & de Jong, A. & Koedijk, C.G., 2004. "Corporate Finance In Europe Confronting Theory With Practice," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2004-002-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    27. Smith, Clifford W. & Stulz, René M., 1985. "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 391-405, December.
    28. Aydin Ozkan, 2001. "Determinants of Capital Structure and Adjustment to Long Run Target: Evidence From UK Company Panel Data," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1-2), pages 175-198.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mohamed, Hisham Hanifa & Masih, Mansur & Bacha, Obiyathulla I., 2015. "Why do issuers issue Sukuk or conventional bond? Evidence from Malaysian listed firms using partial adjustment models," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 233-252.
    2. Biswajit Ghose, 2017. "Impact of Business Group Affiliation on Capital Structure Adjustment Speed: Evidence from Indian Manufacturing Sector," Emerging Economy Studies, International Management Institute, vol. 3(1), pages 54-67, May.
    3. Mai, Nhat Chi, 2012. "Market timing, taxes and capital structure: evidence from Vietnam," OSF Preprints t3mvs, Center for Open Science.
    4. Biswajit Ghose & Kailash Chandra Kabra, 2018. "Dynamic Capital Structure Adjustments and Business Group Affiliations: Indian Evidence," Business Perspectives and Research, , vol. 6(1), pages 27-41, January.
    5. G. Oka Warmana & I. Ketut Rahyuda & Ida Bagus Anom Purbawangsa & Ni Luh Gede Sri Artini, 2020. "Investigating Capital Structure Speed of Adjustment (SOA) of Indonesian Companies for Corporate Value," Global Journal of Flexible Systems Management, Springer;Global Institute of Flexible Systems Management, vol. 21(3), pages 215-231, September.
    6. Dang, Viet Anh & Kim, Minjoo & Shin, Yongcheol, 2012. "Asymmetric capital structure adjustments: New evidence from dynamic panel threshold models," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 465-482.
    7. Vivien Beattie & Alan Goodacre & Sarah Jane Thomson, 2006. "Corporate Financing Decisions: UK Survey Evidence," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(9‐10), pages 1402-1434, November.
    8. Sardo, Filipe & Serrasqueiro, Zélia & Armada, Manuel Rocha, 2022. "The importance of owner loans for rebalancing the capital structure of small knowledge-intensive service firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    9. Canarella, Giorgio & Miller, Stephen M., 2022. "Firm size, corporate debt, R&D activity, and agency costs: Exploring dynamic and non-linear effects," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 25(C).
    10. Viet Anh Dang, 2011. "Testing Capital Structure Theories Using Error Correction Models: Evidence From The Uk, France And Germany," Post-Print hal-00732527, HAL.
    11. Biswajit Ghose & Kailash Chandra Kabra, 2019. "Firm Profitability and Adjustment of Capital Structure: Indian Evidence," Vision, , vol. 23(3), pages 297-308, September.
    12. Dang, Viet Anh & Kim, Minjoo & Shin, Yongcheol, 2014. "Asymmetric adjustment toward optimal capital structure: Evidence from a crisis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 226-242.
    13. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    14. Rubi Ahmad & Oyebola Fatima Etudaiye-Muhtar, 2017. "Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure: Evidence from Nigerian Listed Firms," Global Business Review, International Management Institute, vol. 18(3), pages 590-604, June.
    15. Bontempi, Maria Elena & Bottazzi, Laura & Golinelli, Roberto, 2020. "A multilevel index of heterogeneous short-term and long-term debt dynamics," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    16. Viet Anh Dang, 2013. "Testing capital structure theories using error correction models: evidence from the UK, France and Germany," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(2), pages 171-190, January.
    17. Monda, Barbara & Giorgino, Marco & Modolin, Ileana, 2013. "Rationales for Corporate Risk Management - A Critical Literature Review," MPRA Paper 45420, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Biswajit Ghose & Kailash Chandra Kabra, 2020. "Does Growth Affect Firms’ Leverage Adjustment Speed? A Study of Indian Firms," Business Perspectives and Research, , vol. 8(2), pages 139-155, July.
    19. Mohamed Soufeljil & Asma Sghaier & Zouhayer Mighri & Hanène Kheireddine, 2017. "The financial structure of the Tunisian listed businesses: an application on panel data," Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research, Springer;UNESCO Chair in Entrepreneurship, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, December.
    20. M. E. Bontempi & L. Bottazzi & R. Golinelli, 2015. "Dynamic corporate capital structure behavior: empirical assessment in the light of heterogeneity and non stationarity," Working Papers wp988, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01899182. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.