IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01952128.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Self-insurance in the presence of background risk

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Mahul

    (ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, EAAE - European Association of Agricultural Economists)

Abstract

Cet article montre comment la présence d'un risque sous-jacent inassurable peut inciter un agriculteur à augmenter sa consommation d'intrants destinés à lutter contre un autre risque indépendant. Un risque sous-jacent inassurable a un effet ambigu sur le niveau optimal de l'intrant. Cependant si les préférences de l'agriculteur vérifient la propriété de "standart risk aversion", l'effet de l'introduction d'un risque sous-jacent inassurable n'est plus ambigu et varie selon que la productivité marginale de l'intrant est croissante ou décroissante avec les états de la nature. Un risque catastrophique peut s'apparenter à un tel risque exogène. L'introduction d'une responsabilité limitée en cas de sinistre à travers la mise en place de programmes d'indemnisation des victimes ou la réduction de la probabilité d'occurrence d'un sinistre influencent les décisions d'auto-assurance d'un agriculteur envers un autre risque indépendant.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Mahul, 1996. "Self-insurance in the presence of background risk," Post-Print hal-01952128, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01952128
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01952128
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-01952128/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pratt, John W & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1987. "Proper Risk Aversion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 143-154, January.
    2. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
    3. Eeckhoudt, Louis & Gollier, Christian & Schlesinger, Harris, 1996. "Changes in Background Risk and Risk-Taking Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 683-689, May.
    4. Kimball, Miles S, 1993. "Standard Risk Aversion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 589-611, May.
    5. Howard D. Leathers & John C. Quiggin, 1991. "Interactions between Agricultural and Resource Policy: The Importance of Attitudes toward Risk," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 73(3), pages 757-764.
    6. Lewis, Tracy & Nickerson, David, 1989. "Self-insurance against natural disasters," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 209-223, May.
    7. Doherty, Neil A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1983. "Optimal Insurance in Incomplete Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 1045-1054, December.
    8. Nachman, David C., 1982. "Preservation of "more risk averse" under expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 361-368, December.
    9. Richard E. Just & Rulon D. Pope, 1979. "Production Function Estimation and Related Risk Considerations," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 61(2), pages 276-284.
    10. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
    11. Briys, Eric & Crouhy, Michel & Schlesinger, Harris, 1993. "Optimal hedging in a futures market with background noise and basis risk," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 949-960, June.
    12. Gollier, Christian & Pratt, John W, 1996. "Risk Vulnerability and the Tempering Effect of Background Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1109-1123, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christian Gollier & James Hammitt & Nicolas Treich, 2013. "Risk and choice: A research saga," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 129-145, October.
    2. Louis Eeckhoudt & Harris Schlesinger, 2006. "Putting Risk in Its Proper Place," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 280-289, March.
    3. Kaïs Dachraoui & Georges Dionne & Louis Eeckhoudt & Philippe Godfroid, 2004. "Comparative Mixed Risk Aversion: Definition and Application to Self-Protection and Willingness to Pay," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 261-276, December.
    4. Luigi Guiso & Tullio Jappelli, 1998. "Background Uncertainty and the Demand for Insurance Against Insurable Risks," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 23(1), pages 7-27, June.
    5. Günter Franke & Harris Schlesinger & Richard C. Stapleton, 2006. "Multiplicative Background Risk," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(1), pages 146-153, January.
    6. Fatma Lajeri-Chaherli, 2016. "On The Concavity And Quasiconcavity Properties Of ( Σ , Μ ) Utility Functions," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 287-296, April.
    7. Crainich, David & Eeckhoudt, Louis & Le Courtois, Olivier, 2014. "Decreasing downside risk aversion and background risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 59-63.
    8. Franke, Gunter & Stapleton, Richard C. & Subrahmanyam, Marti G., 1998. "Who Buys and Who Sells Options: The Role of Options in an Economy with Background Risk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 89-109, September.
    9. Malevergne, Y. & Rey, B., 2009. "On cross-risk vulnerability," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 224-229, October.
    10. Koeniger, Winfried, 2001. "Labor and Financial Market Interactions: The Case of Labor Income Risk and Car Insurance in the UK 1969-95," IZA Discussion Papers 240, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Christos I. Giannikos & Georgios Koimisis, 2021. "Equity Premium with Habits, Wealth Inequality and Background Risk," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-15, July.
    12. Luis M. Viceira, 2001. "Optimal Portfolio Choice for Long‐Horizon Investors with Nontradable Labor Income," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(2), pages 433-470, April.
    13. Huang, James, 2014. "Convex and decreasing absolute risk aversion is proper," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 123-125.
    14. Gollier Christian & Schlee Edward E, 2006. "Increased Risk-Bearing with Background Risk," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-29, March.
    15. Michel Denuit & Louis Eeckhoudt & Béatrice Rey, 2010. "Some consequences of correlation aversion in decision science," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 259-269, April.
    16. Thomas Eichner, 2008. "Mean Variance Vulnerability," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(3), pages 586-593, March.
    17. Dana, Rose-Anne & Scarsini, Marco, 2007. "Optimal risk sharing with background risk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 152-176, March.
    18. Lajeri-Chaherli, Fatma, 2004. "Proper prudence, standard prudence and precautionary vulnerability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 29-34, January.
    19. James Huang & Richard Stapleton, 2017. "Higher-order risk vulnerability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(2), pages 387-406, February.
    20. Chiu, W.Henry & Madden, Paul, 2007. "Crime, punishment, and background risks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 543-555, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    risque;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01952128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.