Subjectivity in Inductive Inference
AbstractThis paper examines circumstances under which subjectivity enhances the effectiveness of inductive reasoning. We consider a game in which Fate chooses a data generating process and agents are characterized by inference rules that may be purely objective (or data-based) or may incorporate subjective considerations. The basic intuition is that agents who invoke no subjective considerations are doomed to "overfit" the data and therefore engage in ineffective learning. The analysis places no computational or memory limitations on the agents -- the role for subjectivity emerges in the presence of unlimited reasoning powers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00489433.
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Theoretical Economics, 2012, 7, 2, 183-215
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00489433
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induction; simplicity; Bayesian learning; prediction;
Other versions of this item:
- Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "Subjectivity in Inductive Inference," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1725, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "Subjectivity in Inductive Inference," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000324, David K. Levine.
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-07-14 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
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- Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler, 2011.
"Dynamics of Inductive Inference in a Unified Framework,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000156, David K. Levine.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Samuelson, Larry & Schmeidler, David, 2013. "Dynamics of inductive inference in a unified framework," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1399-1432.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler, 2012. "Dynamics of Inductive Inference in a Unified Framework," Working Papers hal-00712823, HAL.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler, 2011. "Dynamics of Inductive Inference in a Unified Framework," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1811, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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