Why Rationality May Be a Consequence of Hume's Theory of Choice
AbstractFacing R. Sugden's criticism of our interpretation, it is shown in this paper that rationality appears as a possible consequence of Hume's theory of choice. We first argue that Sugden's dismissal of the preference relation from the type of rationality through which Hume's theory is apprehended, is highly disputable, from the point of view of both standard choice theory and Hume's theory of passions. Nonetheless, Sugden's criterion of rationality might be restated in Humean terms as a condition of non-revision of preferences in the dynamics of passions. But, since the process of choice that we have described explicitly takes into account the revision of preferences, and shows that, when this last is no longer required, rationality occurs as an outcome of this process, it is not really concerned by Sugden's criticism.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00343872.
Date of creation: 2005
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Publication status: Published, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2005, 12, 1, 119-126
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Hume; rationality; decision; passion; desire; preference; will; choice; rationalité; décision; désir; préférence; volonté; choix;
Other versions of this item:
- Marc-Arthur Diaye & Andre Lapidus, 2005. "Why rationality may be a consequence of Hume's theory of choice," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 119-126.
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- Sugden, Robert, 1985. "Why Be Consistent? A Critical Analysis of Consistency Requirements in Choice Theory," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 52(206), pages 167-83, May.
- Sugden, Robert, 1991. "Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 751-85, July.
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