The winner's curse: why is the cost of sports mega-events so often underestimated?
AbstractAuction theory, when the bidders do not know the value of what is auctionned, is used to explain how the Olympic Games are allocated to competing bidding cities. It is a centralized allocation process with asymmetric information which usually comes out with a winner's curse. Various indicators of the latter are proposed and exemplified, the major one being the systematic ex ante underestimation of the Olympics costs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00703466.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events, Edward Elgar (Ed.), 2012, 37-69
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auctions; bids; winner's curse; asymmetric information; cost underestimation; mega sporting events; Olympics;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-06-13 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PPM-2012-06-13 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-SPO-2012-06-13 (Sports & Economics)
- NEP-TUR-2012-06-13 (Tourism Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Why are Olympic Games always more expensive than planned?
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-07-05 13:36:00
by himaginary in himaginaryの日記 on 2012-07-25 07:00:00
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