How does Party Fractionalization convey Preferences for Redistribution in Parliamentary Democracies ?
AbstractIn this paper, we highlight the link between the political demand and social policy outcome while taking into account the design of the party system. The political demand is measured by indivudual preferences and the design of the party system is defined as the extent of party fractionalization. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt in the literature to empirically link the political demand and the policy outcome with the help of a direct measure of preferences. Moreover, we account for an additional channel, so far neglected in the literature : The composition effect of the demand. Indeed, the heterogeneity of the demand within countries, more than the level of the demand itself, is shown to have a positive impact on welfare state generosity. This impact increases with the degree of fractionalization of the party system. We run regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries over 23 years, carefully dealing with the issues raised by the use of time-series cross-section data.
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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Political demand; party fractionalization; redistribution; time-series-cross-section data.;
Other versions of this item:
- Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti & Elvire Guillaud, 2008. "How does party fractionalization convey preferences for redistribution in parliamentary democracies?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586259, HAL.
- Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti & Elvire Guillaud, 2008. "How does party fractionalization convey preferences for redistribution in parliamentary democracies ?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne r08093, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-01-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2009-01-10 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Pfarr, Christian & Ulrich, Volker, 2011.
"Discrete-Choice-Experimente zur Ermittlung der Präferenzen für Umverteilung
[Discrete-Choice-Experiments to elicit individuals' preferences for redistribution]," MPRA Paper 31707, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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