Incentives in religious performance: a stochastic dominance approach
AbstractUsing a stochastic dominance approach in an international dataset of about 10,000 Catholic subjects, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a crucial role in religious practice (church attendance and prayer). Furthermore, we find that when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available, the former have a much stronger effect than the latter. The results are confirmed using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series Papers on Economics of Religion with number 10/02.
Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2010
Date of revision:
incentives; rewards; punishment; economics of religion.;
Other versions of this item:
- Teresa Garcia-Munoz, 2010. "Incentives in religious performance: a stochastic dominance approach," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 5(3), pages 176-181, June.
- Tere M. García-Muñoz, 2009. "Incentives in Religious Performance: a Stochastic Dominance Approach," ThE Papers 09/10, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
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