Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Signalling and Self-Insight in the Job Market

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hvide, H.K.

Abstract

The allocation of talent in a society is an important determinant of productivity and growth. I study the informational role of education on the allocation of talent in a two-sector model where education provides workers information about their abilities. When workers and firms are equally ignorant about the abilities of a worker the unique equilibrium (Pareto-efficient) induces the mediocre to educate, while the least and the most able skip education. When workers know more than firms about their abilities, the equilibrium set expands to include equilibria where education serves as a signal. Signaling is consistent with both the most able educating, but also with the mediocre educating, and the most able skipping education.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 2-99.

as in new window
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:2-99

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.
Phone: 972-3-640-9255
Fax: 972-3-640-5815
Email:
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: EDUCATION ; LABOUR MARKET ; HUMAN CAPITAL ; INFORMATION;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:2-99. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.