Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences
AbstractIn this paper we analyze the explicit representation of fixed agenda social choice correspondences under different rationality assumptions (independence, neutrality, monotonicity,...).It is well known in the literature that, under some of these assumptions, the existence of dictators, oligarchies or individuals with veto power can be proven; butno information about the social choice set is obtained.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 9811.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.
SOCIAL CHOICE ; MODELS;
Other versions of this item:
- Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Mª Carmen Sánchez, 1998. "- Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- J. E. Peris & M-C. Sánchez, 1998. "Fixed agenda social choice correspondences," THEMA Working Papers 98-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Denicolo Vincenzo, 1993.
"Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Correspondences and Social Decision Functions,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 324-332, April.
- Vincenzo Denicolo, 1989. "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Corrispondences and Social Decision Functions," Working Papers 84, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-43, July.
- Aleskerov, Fuad, 1992. "Relational-Functional Voting Operations," Working Papers 818, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1987. "Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 311-314.
- Moulin,Hervi, 1991. "Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521424585, April.
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