Innovation Fertility and Patent Design
AbstractIt may be advantageous to provide a variety of kinds of patent protection to heterogenous innovations. Innovations which benefit society largely through their use as building blocks to future inventions may require a different scope of protection in order to be encouraged, sine expected profits are often decresing in a products usefulness to others when the others are competitors. We model the problem of designing an optimal patent menu when the fertility of an innovation in generating more innovations cannot be observed when the patent is granted and characterize the optimal menu when breadth is a choice variable of the patent authority.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Minnesota - Center for Economic Research in its series Papers with number 303.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA 35455 U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.econ.umn.edu/
More information through EDIRC
PATENTS ; INNOVATIONS;
Other versions of this item:
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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