The Dual Effects of Intellectual Property Regulations: Within- and Between- Patent Competition in the US Pharmaceuticals Industry
AbstractA patent only protects an innovator from others producing the same product, but it does not protect him from others producing better products under new patents. Therefore, one may divide up the source of competition facing an innovator into within-patent competition, which results from production of the same product, and betweenpatent competition, which results from production of products on other patents. Previous theoretical and empirical micro -based analyses have emphasized the effects of intellectual property regulations on within -patent competition by showing how protecting innovative returns from imitators raises R&D incentives. However, between-patent competition affects innovative returns, particularly through creative destruction in the many high-tech industries that seem central to overall economic progress. This suggests that a fuller understanding of IP-regulations take into account its effects on between-patent competition. We find that the total effects of intellectual property regulations depend heavily on whether these unexplored effects are present. We attempt to estimate the relative magnitudes of the two sources of competition in limiting innovative returns in the U.S. pharmaceuticals market. In this market within -patent competition from so-called generic producers has been analyzed relatively more compared to competition between-patents through so called therapeutic competition. We estimate that between-patent competition, most of which occurs while a drug is under patent, costs the innovator at least as much as within-patent competition, which cannot occur until a drug is off patent. The reduction in the present discounted value of the innovator's return from between-patent competition appears to be at least as large as the reduction from competition within -patents, and may be much larger.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9303.
Date of creation: Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Litchenberg, Frank R. and Tomas Philipson. “The Dual Effects of Intellectual Property Regulations: Within- and Between-Patent Competition in The US Pharmaceuticals Industry." Journal of Law & Economics 45 (2002): 643-672.
Note: HC HE PR
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Frank R. Lichtenberg & Tomas J. Philipson, 2002. "The Dual Effects of Intellectual Property Regulations: Within- and Between-Patent Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceuticals Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(S2), pages 643-672.
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-11-04 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klemperer, Paul, 1990.
"How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 113-130, Spring.
- Hall, Bronwyn & Van Reenen, John, 2000. "How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A review of the evidence," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 449-469, April.
- Suzanne Scotchmer, 1996. "Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products Be Patentable?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 322-331, Summer.
- Gilbert, R. & Shapiro, C., 1988.
"Optimal Patent Length And Breadth,"
28, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October.
- Berndt, Ernst R, et al, 1995. "Information, Marketing, and Pricing in the U.S. Antiulcer Drug Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 100-105, May.
- Aghion, P. & Howitt, P., 1989.
"A Model Of Growth Through Creative Destruction,"
527, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, 1990. "A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction," NBER Working Papers 3223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aghion, P. & Howitt, P., 1989. "A Model Of Growth Through Creative Destruction," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 8904, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Aghion, P. & Howitt, P., 1990. "A Model Of Growth Through Creative Destruction," DELTA Working Papers 90-12, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Judd, Kenneth L, 1985. "On the Performance of Patents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 567-85, May.
- Pakes, Ariel S, 1986.
"Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks,"
Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 755-84, July.
- Ariel Pakes, 1986. "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks," NBER Working Papers 1340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wright, Brian Davern, 1983. "The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 691-707, September.
- Z. John Lu & William S. Comanor, 1998. "Strategic Pricing Of New Pharmaceuticals," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 108-118, February.
- Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1992. "A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction," Scholarly Articles 12490578, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1995.
"On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 20-33, Spring.
- Green, J.R. & Scotchmer, S., 1993. "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1638, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring.
- Joseph A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, 2005.
"The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research and Development: Trends in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development - The Authors' Reply,"
Springer Healthcare | Adis, vol. 23(12), pages 1193-1202.
- Joseph DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, 2005. "The economics of follow-on drug research and development: Trends in entry rates and the timing of development — The authors’ reply," PharmacoEconomics, Springer, vol. 23(12), pages 1193-1202, December.
- Michael Yuan, 2006. "A better copyright system? comparing welfare of indefinitely renewable copyright versus fixed-length copyright," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(6), pages 519-542.
- Peter Arcidiacono & Paul B. Ellickson & Peter Landry & David B. Ridley, 2013.
NBER Working Papers
19522, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John Cawley & John A. Rizzo, 2005. "The Competitive Effects of Drug Withdrawals," NBER Working Papers 11223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Francesco Laforgia & Fabio Montobbio & Luigi Orsenigo, 2007. "IPRs, technological and industrial development and growth: the case of the pharmaceutical industry," KITeS Working Papers 206, KITeS, Centre for Knowledge, Internationalization and Technology Studies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Oct 2007.
- Laura Magazzini & Fabio Pammolli & Massimo Riccaboni, 2009. "Nuove politiche per l'innovazione nel settore delle scienze della vita," Working Papers 03-2009, Competitività Regole Mecati (CERM).
- Hostenkamp, Gisela, 2013. "Do follow-on therapeutic substitutes induce price competition between hospital medicines? Evidence from the Danish hospital sector," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 68-77.
- Frank R. Lichtenberg, 2002. "The Effect of Changes in Drug Utilization on Labor Supply and Per Capita Output," NBER Working Papers 9139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alexander Heuer & Malwina Mejer & Jennifer Neuhaus, 2007. "The National Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets and the Timing of New Drug Launches in Europe," Kiel Advanced Studies Working Papers 437, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.