We study the efficient mechanism for downsizing the public sector focusing on adverse selection in productive efficiency. Each agent is assumed to have two type-dependent reservation utilities: the status quo utility in the public sector before downsizing and the utility that he expects to obtain if he enters the private sector.
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Paper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number
98.509.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Boundaries of Public and Private Enterprise; Privatization; Contracting Out
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