IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedpwp/09-24.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Why do markets freeze?

Author

Listed:
  • Philip Bond
  • Yaron Leitner

Abstract

Consider the sale of mortgages by a loan originator to a buyer. As widely noted, such a transaction is subject to a severe adverse selection problem: the originator has a natural information advantage and will attempt to sell only the worst mortgages. However, a second important feature of this transaction has received much less attention: both the seller and the buyer may have existing inventories of mortgages similar to those being sold. The authors analyze how the presence of such inventories affects trade. They use their model to discuss implications for regulatory intervention in illiquid markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2009. "Why do markets freeze?," Working Papers 09-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:09-24
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/working-papers/2009/wp09-24.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Viral V. Acharya & Douglas Gale & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2011. "Rollover Risk and Market Freezes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(4), pages 1177-1209, August.
    2. Samuelson, William F, 1984. "Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 995-1005, July.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit Freeze," NBER Working Papers 14925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Easley, David & O'Hara, Maureen, 2010. "Liquidity and valuation in an uncertain world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 1-11, July.
    5. Heaton, John C. & Lucas, Deborah & McDonald, Robert L., 2010. "Is mark-to-market accounting destabilizing? Analysis and implications for policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 64-75, January.
    6. Guillaume Plantin & Haresh Sapra & Hyun Song Shin, 2008. "Marking‐to‐Market: Panacea or Pandora's Box?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 435-460, May.
    7. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena, 2008. "Mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 358-378, August.
    8. Adrian, Tobias & Shin, Hyun Song, 2010. "Liquidity and leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 418-437, July.
    9. Ashcraft, Adam B. & Schuermann, Til, 2008. "Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 191-309, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bond, Philip & Leitner, Yaron, 2015. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 155-167.
    2. Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2010. "Market run-ups, market freezes, and leverage," Working Papers 10-36, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    3. Huizinga, H.P. & Laeven, L., 2009. "Accounting Discretion of Banks During a Financial Crisis," Discussion Paper 2009-58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Michael B. Imerman, 2020. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 1371-1406, November.
    5. Michael B. Imerman, 0. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-36.
    6. Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2013. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Working Papers 13-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    7. Leila Gharbi & Khamoussi Halioui, 2011. "La juste valeur des instruments financiers : Un nouveau canal de contagion ?," Post-Print hal-00650435, HAL.
    8. Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2012. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Working Papers 12-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    9. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Marking to Market versus Taking to Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(8), pages 2246-2276, August.
    10. Alex Dontoh & Fayez A. Elayan & Joshua Ronen & Tavy Ronen, 2021. "Unfair “Fair Value” in Illiquid Markets: Information Spillover Effects in Times of Crisis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(8), pages 5163-5193, August.
    11. Clemens A. Otto & Paolo F. Volpin, 2018. "Marking to Market and Inefficient Investment Decisions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(8), pages 3756-3771, August.
    12. Gaëtan Le Quang, 2018. ""Taking Diversity into Account": Real Effects of Accounting Measurement on Asset Allocation," Working Papers hal-04141805, HAL.
    13. Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2010. "Amplification Mechanisms in Liquidity Crises," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 1-30, July.
    14. Kirsten Schmidt & Felix Noth & Lena Tonzer, 2022. "A Note of Caution on Quantifying Banks' Recapitalization Effects," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(4), pages 1123-1133, June.
    15. Bernhard Pellens & Stefan Jannett & André Schmidt, 2009. "Bilanzierungsstandards im Kontext der Finanzmarktkrise," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(4), pages 413-435, November.
    16. , & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2013. "Liquidity hoarding," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    17. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena, 2013. "New theories to underpin financial reform," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 242-249.
    18. Freixas, Xavier & Laux, Christian, 2011. "Disclosure, transparency, and market discipline," CFS Working Paper Series 2011/11, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    19. Kohlbeck, Mark & Smith, Thomas & Valencia, Adrian, 2017. "Auditors and net transfers of Level 3 fair-valued financial instruments," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 27-39.
    20. Palea, Vera, 2019. "Accounting for Sustainable Finance: Does Fair value Accounting Fit for Long-term Investing in Equity?," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201912, University of Turin.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mortgage loans;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:09-24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Beth Paul (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbphus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.