Repo and securities lending
AbstractWe provide an overview of data requirements necessary to monitor repurchase agreements (repos) and securities lending (sec lending) markets for the purposes of informing policymakers and researchers about firm-level and systemic risk. We start by explaining the functioning of these markets, and argue that it is crucial to understand the institutional arrangements. Data collection is currently incomplete. A comprehensive collection should include six characteristics of repo and sec lending trades at the firm level: principal amount, interest rate, collateral type, haircut, tenor, and counterparty.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 529.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-02-01 (Banking)
- NEP-BEC-2012-02-01 (Business Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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