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The Treasury auction process: objectives, structure, and recent acquisitions

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Author Info
Kenneth D. Garbade
Jeffrey F. Ingber

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Abstract

Treasury auctions are designed to minimize the cost of financing the national debt by promoting broad, competitive bidding and liquid secondary market trading. A review of the auction process-from the announcement of a new issue to the delivery of securities-reveals how these objectives have been met. Also highlighted are changes in the auction process that stem from recent advances in information-processing technologies and risk management techniques.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its journal Current Issues in Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): (2005)
Issue (Month): Feb ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednci:y:2005:i:feb:n:v.11no.2

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Related research
Keywords: Auctions ; Government securities ; Treasury bills ; Treasury notes;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Simon, David P., 1994. "Markups, quantity risk, and bidding strategies at treasury coupon auctions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 43-62, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cammack, Elizabeth B, 1991. "Evidence on Bidding Strategies and the Information in Treasury Bill Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 100-130, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bruce Mizrach & Christopher J. Neely, 2006. "The transition to electronic communications networks in the secondary treasury market," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 527-542. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bruce Mizrach & Christopher J. Neely, 2007. "The microstructure of the U.S. treasury market," Working Papers 2007-052, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
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