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Clearinghouse access and bank runs: comparing New York and Chicago during the Panic of 1907

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Listed:
  • Jon R. Moen
  • Ellis W. Tallman

Abstract

During the Panic of 1907, New York City trust companies were not members of the New York Clearinghouse whereas trust companies in Chicago were members of the Chicago Clearinghouse. We argue that the apparent isolation of New York City trust companies from the pool of bank reserves controlled by the New York Clearinghouse led to the large-scale depositor runs on the New York City trusts. In contrast, Chicago trust companies had direct access to the Chicago Clearinghouse and their pool of reserves and did not suffer large-scale depositor withdrawals. Statistical evidence on a cross-section of intermediaries in both New York and Chicago supports this contention.

Suggested Citation

  • Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, 1995. "Clearinghouse access and bank runs: comparing New York and Chicago during the Panic of 1907," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 95-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:95-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, 1991. "The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets and Financial Crises, pages 109-174, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Timberlake, Richard H, Jr, 1984. "The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, February.
    4. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 277-283, June.
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