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Impure Public Goods and Technological Interdependencies

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  • Dirk T.G. Rübbelke

    (Chemnitz University of Technology)

  • Andreas Löschel

    (Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung)

Abstract

Impure public goods represent an important group of goods. Almost every public good exerts not only effects which are public to all but also effects which are private to the producer of this good. What is often omitted in the analysis of impure public goods is the fact that – regularly – these private effects can also be generated independently of the public good. In our analysis we focus on the effects alternative technologies – independently generating the private effects of the public good – may have on the provision of impure public goods. After the investigation in an analytical impure public good model, we numerically simulate the effects of alternative technologies in a parameterized model for climate policy in Germany.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2005.60.

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Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.60

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Keywords: Impure public goods; Climate policy; Rationing;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Costantini, Valeria & Mazzanti, Massimiliano, 2012. "On the green and innovative side of trade competitiveness? The impact of environmental policies and innovation on EU exports," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 132-153.
  2. Dirk T.G. Rübbelke & Anil Markandya, 2008. "Impure Public Technologies and Environmental Policy," Working Papers 2008.76, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Antonio Musolesi, 2011. "Income and time related effects in EKC," Working Papers 201105, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
  4. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Giulio Cainelli & Roberto Zoboli, 2008. "The Relationship Between Environmental Efficiency and Manufacturing Firm’s Growth," Working Papers 2008.99, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Pittel, Karen & Rübbelke, Dirk T. G., 2007. "Climate Policy and Ancillary Benefits: A Survey and Integration into the Modelling of International Negotiations on Climate Change," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-064, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  6. Massimiliano Corradini & Valeria Costantini & Susanna Mancinelli & Massimiliano Mazzanti, 2011. "Environmental and innovation performance in a dynamic impure public good framework," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0141, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
  7. repec:ept:journl:v:xxiv:y:2007:i:192en:p:369-406 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Giulio Cainelli & Massimiliano Mazzanti & Roberto Zoboli, 2011. "Enviromental Innovations, Complementarity and Local/Global Cooperation," Working Papers 201104, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
  9. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Antonio Musolesi, 2010. "Carbon Abatement Leaders and Laggards Non Parametric Analyses of Policy Oriented Kuznets Curves," Working Papers 2010.149, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  10. Mazzanti, Massimiliano & Zoboli, Roberto, 2009. "Environmental efficiency and labour productivity: Trade-off or joint dynamics? A theoretical investigation and empirical evidence from Italy using NAMEA," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 1182-1194, February.
  11. Nathan Rive & Dirk Rübbelke, 2010. "International environmental policy and poverty alleviation," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 515-543, September.

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