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Behavioral Biases of Dealers in U.S. Treasury Auctions

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Author Info
David Goldreich (London Business School and CEPR)
Abstract

This paper provides evidence of bounded rationality by large dealers in U.S. Treasury auctions. I argue that these dealers use a heuristic of yield-space bidding which leads to biases manifested in three ways: they submit dominated bids, i.e., those that could be improved without raising the bidding price; they bid in a manner that disregards the unevenly spaced price grid; and they round bids in yield space. Consistent with bounded rationality, I show that bidders are less susceptible to bias when the cost of suboptimal bidding is high. While the literature provides substantial evidence of behavioral biases among individual investors, they are less well documented for large sophisticated institutions that are likely to be important for setting asset prices. These primary bond dealers who regularly bid for billions of dollars in Treasury bill auctions are precisely such economic agents.

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2004.143.

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Date of creation: Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.143

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Related research
Keywords: Treasury auctions Behavioral finance

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management
H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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  1. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Huberman, Gur, 2001. "Familiarity Breeds Investment," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(3), pages 659-80.
  3. Daniel Kahneman, 2003. "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1449-1475, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Terrance Odean, 1998. "Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(5), pages 1775-1798, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, 2002. "A Survey of Behavioral Finance," NBER Working Papers 9222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Michael J. Fleming & Kenneth D. Garbade & Frank Keane, 2004. "Anomalous bidding in short-term Treasury bill auctions," Staff Reports 184, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  7. French, Kenneth R & Poterba, James M, 1991. "Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 222-26, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Cammack, Elizabeth B, 1991. "Evidence on Bidding Strategies and the Information in Treasury Bill Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 100-130, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Harris, Lawrence, 1991. "Stock Price Clustering and Discreteness," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(3), pages 389-415. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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