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Which incentives work? An experimental analysis of incentives for trainers

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  • Omar Azfar
  • Clifford Zinnes

Abstract

One conjecture in the theory of incentives is that incentives based on broader outcomes may be better at motivating agents than incentives based on narrow measures. We designed an experiment to test these hypotheses using a "prospective randomized evaluation procedure" (PREP). We then apply PREP to training programs as typically funded by donors of economic development assistance. We randomly assigned 274 participating entrepreneurs in the Philippines to one of 26, simultaneous, one-day, training classes in marketing. Trainers were given cash incentives based on the average score of their "students" on a standardized test containing an alternative number of questions, which were randomly assigned to each class. We then examined outcomes based on student satisfaction ratings of the trainer. Our results suggest that incentives based on broad outcomes are more effective than incentives based on narrow outcomes. We conclude with ways to improve our approach as well as with a discussion of the implications for using prospective randomized evaluation for improving the evaluation of donor projects.

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  • Omar Azfar & Clifford Zinnes, 2006. "Which incentives work? An experimental analysis of incentives for trainers," Natural Field Experiments 00209, The Field Experiments Website.
    • Handle: RePEc:feb:natura:00209
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    Cited by:

    1. John List, 2020. "2020: A Summary of Framed Field Experiments on fieldexperiments.com: The Who's, What's Where's, and When's," Framed Field Experiments 00716, The Field Experiments Website.
    2. John List, 2019. "A Summary Of Papers On Fieldexperiments.Com: All Field Experiments Posted," Artefactual Field Experiments 00650, The Field Experiments Website.
    3. John List, 2023. "2022: A Summary Of Artefactual Field Experiments On Fieldexperiments.Com: The Who'S, What'S, Where'S, And When'S," Artefactual Field Experiments 00767, The Field Experiments Website.
    4. John List, 2019. "Summary Data of Natural Field Experiments Published on fieldexperiments.com," Natural Field Experiments 00677, The Field Experiments Website.
    5. Levitt, Steven D. & List, John A., 2009. "Field experiments in economics: The past, the present, and the future," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-18, January.
    6. John List, 2020. "2020 Summary Data of Natural Field Experiments Published on fieldexperiments.com," Natural Field Experiments 00714, The Field Experiments Website.
    7. John List, 2020. "2020: A Summary of Artefactual Field Experiments on fieldexperiments.com: The Who's, What's, Where's, and When's," Artefactual Field Experiments 00721, The Field Experiments Website.
    8. John List, 2023. "2022 Summary Data Of Natural Field Experiments Published On Fieldexperiments.Com," Natural Field Experiments 00770, The Field Experiments Website.
    9. John List, 2023. "2022: A Summary Of Framed Field Experiments On Fieldexperiments.Com: The Who'S, What'S, Where'S, And When'S," Framed Field Experiments 00768, The Field Experiments Website.
    10. John List, 2019. "A Summary of Artefactual Field Experiments On fieldexperiments.com: The Who's, What's, Where's, and When's," Artefactual Field Experiments 00671, The Field Experiments Website.
    11. John List, 2024. "Natural Field Experiments Published In 2023 On Fieldexperiments.Com," Natural Field Experiments 00785, The Field Experiments Website.
    12. Gautam Gupta, 2019. "Experiments in Economics: A Survey," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 7(1), pages 89-109, June.
    13. John List, 2024. "A Summary Of Artefactual Field Experiments On Fieldexperiments.Com In 2023:The Who'S, What'S, Where'S, And When'S," Artefactual Field Experiments 00782, The Field Experiments Website.
    14. John List, 2024. "A Summary Of Framed Field Experiments Published In 2023 On Fieldexperiments.Com," Framed Field Experiments 00784, The Field Experiments Website.

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