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How to pay traders in information markets? Results from a field experiment

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  • Stefan Luckner
  • Christof Weinhardt

Abstract

The results of recent studies on prediction markets are encouraging. Prior experience demonstrates that markets with different incentive schemes predicted uncertain future events remarkably accurately. In this paper, we study the impact of different monetary incentives on prediction accuracy in a field experiment. In order to do so, we compare three groups of traders, corresponding to three treatments with different payment schemes, in a prediction market for the FIFA World Cup 2006. Somewhat surprisingly, our results show that performance-related payment schemes do not necessarily increase the prediction accuracy. Due to the risk aversion of traders the competitive environment in a rank-order tournament leads to the best results in terms of prediction accuracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Luckner & Christof Weinhardt, 2007. "How to pay traders in information markets? Results from a field experiment," Artefactual Field Experiments 00107, The Field Experiments Website.
    • Handle: RePEc:feb:artefa:00107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carsten Schmidt & Axel Werwatz, 2002. "How accurate do markets predict the outcome of an event? The Euro 2000 soccer championships experiment," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-09, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    2. Daniel Read, 2005. "Monetary incentives, what are they good for?," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 265-276.
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    Cited by:

    1. Strijbis, Oliver & Arnesen, Sveinung, 2019. "Explaining variance in the accuracy of prediction markets," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 408-419.
    2. Galliera, Arianna, 2018. "Self-selecting random or cumulative pay? A bargaining experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 106-120.
    3. Edoardo Gaffeo, 2013. "Using information markets in grantmaking. An assessment of the issues involved and an application to Italian banking foundations," DEM Discussion Papers 2013/08, Department of Economics and Management.
    4. Patrick Buckley & Fergal O’Brien, 0. "The effect of malicious manipulations on prediction market accuracy," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-13.
    5. Ivo Blohm & Christoph Riedl & Johann Fuller & Orhan Koroglu & Jan Marco Leimeister & Helmut Krcmar, 2012. "The Effects of Prediction Market Design and Price Elasticity on Trading Performance of Users: An Experimental Analysis," Papers 1204.3457, arXiv.org.
    6. Martin Spann & Bernd Skiera, 2009. "Sports forecasting: a comparison of the forecast accuracy of prediction markets, betting odds and tipsters," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(1), pages 55-72.
    7. Palan, Stefan, 2010. "Digital options and efficiency in experimental asset markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 506-522, September.
    8. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    9. Ivo Blohm & Christoph Riedl & Johann Füller & Jan Marco Leimeister, 2016. "Rate or Trade? Identifying Winning Ideas in Open Idea Sourcing," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 27(1), pages 27-48, March.
    10. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    11. Patrick Buckley & Fergal O’Brien, 2017. "The effect of malicious manipulations on prediction market accuracy," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 611-623, June.
    12. Arianna Galliera & Noemi Pace, 2015. "To Switch or Not to Switch Payment Scheme? Determinants and Effects in a Bargaining Game," Working Papers 2015:33, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

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