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High interest rates: the golden rule for bank stability in the Diamond-Dybvig model

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  • J. D. P. Bertolai
  • R. de O. Cavalcanti

Abstract

In a companion paper, Bertolai et al. (2011) build on Peck-Shell (2003) economies and obtain strong implementation in perturbations of optimal contracts. Since bank runs are eliminated with distortions that become very small when the population grows, a pressing issue is whether an alternative specification can generate the costly crisis that are common in history. We find, in this paper, an affirmative answer in the context of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, and uncover the role played by societal weights on future consumption and solvency risk. An extension of the Ennis-Keister (2009) algorithm shows the impact of run strategies and implicit rates of interest on the formation of expectations, in line with some classical views.

Suggested Citation

  • J. D. P. Bertolai & R. de O. Cavalcanti, 2011. "High interest rates: the golden rule for bank stability in the Diamond-Dybvig model," Working Papers 14-2011, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
    • Handle: RePEc:fea:wpaper:14-2011
    as

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    File URL: ftp://cpq.fearp.usp.br:2300/textos_discussao/eco/2011/TD-E14-2011.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed & Wallace, Neil, 2007. "The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 709-715, November.
    2. R. de O. Cavalcanti & P. K. Monteiro, 2016. "Enriching information to prevent bank runs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(3), pages 477-494, August.
    3. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2009. "Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1996-2020, September.
    4. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    5. Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti, 2010. "Inside-money theory after Diamond and Dybvig," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 96(1Q), pages 59-82.
    6. Cavalcanti, Ricardo de Oliveira & Bertolai, Jefferson Donizeti Pereira & Monteiro, P. K., 2011. "A note on convergence of Peck-Shell and Green-Lin mechanisms in the Diamond-Dybvig model," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 722, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    7. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bertolai, Jefferson Donizeti Pereira & Cavalcanti, Ricardo de Oliveira, 2013. "Opposite policy implications in the theory of money and banking," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 67(4), November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    severe aggregate-uncertainty; mixed-strategy bank runs; Insolvency; dynamic programmin;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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