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Property Rights and the New Institutional Arrangement for Product Innovation in Silicon Valley

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Author Info
Hirokazu Takizawa
Abstract

This paper surveys researches on the new institutional arrangements for product innovation emerging in Silicon Valley. Special reference is made to the characteristics that go beyond the traditional property rights framework. First, the complicated patterns in allocation of control rights observed in VC contracts are examined to show the limit of Grosman-Hart-Moore framework. Second, the unique informational arrangement in Silicon Valley is explained as a second-best solution to the team-theoretic coordination problems in modular environments. Third, the paper examines the mechanism of ex post evolutionary formation of a product system. The paper concludes by suggesting future direction for research, including further research on the role of innovation commons in this process.

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Paper provided by Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in its series Discussion papers with number 03009.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003
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Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:03009

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