Quantifying Spatial Mislocation in Centrally Provided Public Goods
AbstractIn this paper they show how an optimization algorithm can be used to approximately quantify the costs to users of spatial misallocation in centrally provided public goods. This method can be employed to evaluate the large programs of public good construction that have been central features of economic plans in many developing countries. They apply these methods to the allocation of post-oﬃces in an administrative block of South India between1981-1991and ﬁnd that more appropriate choices for post oﬃce locations could have reduced aggregate costs of travel to citizens in this area by at least20%. [Working Paper No. 148]
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optimization; algorithm; approximately; quantify; misallocation; spatial; public good; construction; developing countries; travel; citizens;
Other versions of this item:
- Athreya, Siva & Somanathan, Rohini, 2008. "Quantifying spatial misallocation in centrally provided public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 201-206, February.
- Siva Athreya & Rohini Somanathan, 2006. "Quantifying Spatial Misallocation In Centrally Provided Public Goods," Working papers 148, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2010-10-09 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2010-10-09 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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