Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy
AbstractWe study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. Within this setup, we ask whether policymakers should interfere when better informed agents make individual investment decisions. We find that when the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be taxed. Conversely, any positive investment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable. We also show that an investment tax may increase overall investment activity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ESMT European School of Management and Technology in its series ESMT Research Working Papers with number ESMT-10-007.
Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 17 Nov 2010
Date of revision:
information externality; strategic waiting; delay; information cascade; investment boom; optimal taxation;
Other versions of this item:
- Heidhues, Paul & Melissas, Nicolas, 2010. "Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 306, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Paul Heidhues & Nicolas Melissas, 2010. "Technology Adoption, Socila Learning, and Economic Policy," Working Papers 1002, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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