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The fi nagle point might not be within the Ɛ-core: a contradiction with Bräuninger's result

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  • Mathieu Martin
  • Zéphirin Nganmeni

    (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)

Abstract

In this paper, we focus on a result stated by Bräuninger that the fi nagle point is within the Ɛ-core in a spatial voting game with Euclidean individual preferences. Through a counterex- ample with 7 players, we show that Bräuninger's result is not valid.

Suggested Citation

  • Mathieu Martin & Zéphirin Nganmeni, 2019. "The fi nagle point might not be within the Ɛ-core: a contradiction with Bräuninger's result," THEMA Working Papers 2019-03, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2019-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Saari, Donald G., 2014. "Unifying voting theory from Nakamura’s to Greenberg’s theorems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 1-11.
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    3. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "The instability of instability of centered distributions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 53-73, January.
    4. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "The epsilon core of a large replica game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 277-300, July.
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    6. Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1991. "Incumbency Advantage, Voter Loyalty and the Benefit of the Doubt," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(2), pages 115-137, April.
    7. Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-157, January.
    8. Craig A Tovey, 2011. "The finagle point and the epsilon-core: A comment on Bräuninger’s proof," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(1), pages 135-139, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Spatial voting; majority game; dominance; core; fi nagle.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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