This paper suggests that rights are best seen as being part of the description of a social state rather than as constituents of the mechanism by means of which society selects a social state. A theory of this kind is outlined in which a social state is modeled as an equilibrium in the game of life played by the citizens of a society.
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Paper provided by ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution in its series ELSE working papers with number
053.
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Gaertner, Wulf & Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992.
"Individual Rights Revisited,"
Economica,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(234), pages 161-77, May.
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