Large buyers, preferential treatment and cartel stability
AbstractBilateral deals for large clients or key account management (henceforth KAM) is traditionally justified in terms of the importance of a long-term association between a firm and such clients. However, in this paper we offer a different rationale for a seller to apply KAM to its large buyers. When facing large buyers, a firm can use KAM to deal with such buyers
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia in its series Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica with number 0051.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2013
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Buyer group; key account management; cartel stability;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-03-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HME-2013-03-02 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-IND-2013-03-02 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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