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Large buyers, preferential treatment and cartel stability

Author

Listed:
  • Manel Antelo

    (Departamento de Fundamentos da Análise Económica, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)

  • Lluis Bru

    (Department d'Economia de l'Empresa, Universitat de les Illes Baleares)

Abstract

Bilateral deals for large clients or key account management (henceforth KAM) is traditionally justified in terms of the importance of a long-term association between a firm and such clients. However, in this paper we offer a different rationale for a seller to apply KAM to its large buyers. When facing large buyers, a firm can use KAM to deal with such buyers

Suggested Citation

  • Manel Antelo & Lluis Bru, 2013. "Large buyers, preferential treatment and cartel stability," Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica 0051, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia.
    • Handle: RePEc:edg:anecon:0051
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Buyer group; key account management; cartel stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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