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Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling

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Wang, Ruqu

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Abstract

Two popular selling methods--posted-price selling and auctions--are compared here in an independent private-values model. Without auctioning costs, auctioning is always optimal. When auctioning is costly, auctions are still preferable if the marginal-revenue curve is sufficiently steep. The global steepness of the marginal-revenue curve is found to coincide with the dispersion around the mean for a number of standard distributions. Finally, the prices of the monopoly seller and of the social optimum are compared. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 83 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 838-51
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:83:y:1993:i:4:p:838-51

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  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 3774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Robert S. Goldfarb, 2000. "An Onassis Retrospective: What Products Are Auctioned, and Why?," Journal of Economic Education, Helen Dwight Reid Foundation, vol. 31(2), pages 157-168. [Downloadable!]
  3. Walter Beckert, 2004. "Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0404, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul D. Klemperer, 2007. "When are Auctions Best?," NBER Working Papers 13268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Jose Canals-Cerda, 2005. "Congestion Pricing in an Internet Market," Working Papers 05-10, NET Institute, revised Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
  6. A. Masters & A. Muthoo, 2003. "Ex Ante Price Commitment with Renegotiation in a Dynamic Market," Economics Discussion Papers 555, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Shunda, Nicholas, 2009. "Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough)," MPRA Paper 16242, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Kultti, K., 1997. "Price formation by bargaining and posted prices," Discussion Paper 56, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Nicholas Shunda, 2007. "Auctions with a Buy Price: The Case of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Working papers 2007-42, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Xin Wang & Alan Montgomery & Kannan Srinivasan, 2008. "When auction meets fixed price: a theoretical and empirical examination of buy-it-now auctions," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 339-370, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Young Han Lee & Ulrike Malmendier, 2007. "The Bidder's Curse," NBER Working Papers 13699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Adrian Masters & Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "Ex-Ante Price Commitment with Renegotiation in a Dynamic Market Equilibrium," ILR working papers 056, Institute for Labour Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2001. "Residual Wage Disparity and Coordination Unemployment," CAM Working Papers 2004-20, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics, revised Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Alexandre ZIEGLER, 2002. "When are Retail Stores Preferable to Auctions ?," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 02.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
  15. Sarah Parlane, 2003. "Auction Versus Private Treaty," Working Papers 200306, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
  16. Ernan Haruvy & Peter Popkowski Leszczyc & Octavian Carare & James Cox & Eric Greenleaf & Wolfgang Jank & Sandy Jap & Young-Hoon Park & Michael Rothkopf, 2008. "Competition between auctions," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 431-448, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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