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Joint Bidding in Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions

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Author Info
Ken Hendricks (University of British Columbia)
Rob Porter (University of British Columbia)
Guofu Tan (University of British Columbia)

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Abstract

This paper provides an explanation for why cartels are not observed frequently in mineral-rights auctions even though it was not illegal for them to form. We use the techniques of mechanism design to characterize the efficient, incentive compatible cartel and show that it can be implemented by a first-price knockout tournament with information sharing. We show, however, that bidders with the highest signals typically prefer to bid alone rather than join the cartel. We examine bid data from federal offshore oil and gas auctions for evidence that cartels used bid coordination schemes. We also examine the determinants of joint bidding.

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File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1763.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 1763.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1763

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  1. Porter, Robert H, 1995. "The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 1-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Quang Vuong & Sandra Campo & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 179-207. [Downloadable!]
  2. Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2003. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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