This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Rents, Votes, and Protection: Explaining the Structure of Trade Barriers Across Industries

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Scott Bradford (Brigham Young University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper develops a model of the structure of protection across industries. We model five types of agents: policy makers, producers, importers, workers, and consumers. The model implies that protection increases with workforce size and decreases with lobbying costs. The effects of both output and imports are ambiguous. We test the model with US data, including new measures of protection, and confirm most of its implications. We do not find evidence that protection increases with output. The empirical results also suggest that policy makers weight campaign contributions about 12 per cent more heavily than national income.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1717.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 1717.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1717

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Richard E. Caves, 1976. "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 9(2), pages 278-300, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rodrik, Dani, 1986. "Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 285-299, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. J. Michael Finger & Ann Harrison, 1994. "The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade?," NBER Working Papers 4751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Noland, Marcus, 1995. "Why are prices in Japan so high?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 255-261, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Goldstein, Judith, 1988. "Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(01), pages 179-217, December. [Downloadable!]
  7. Michael M. Knetter, 1994. "Why are Retail Prices in Japan so High?: Evidence from German Export Prices," NBER Working Papers 4894, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Goldstein, Judith, 1988. "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 42(1), pages 179-217, Winter.
  9. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982. "Shifting Comparative Advantage, Protectionist Demands, and Policy Response," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 151-196 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kishore Gawande, 1998. "Comparing Theories Of Endogenous Protection: Bayesian Comparison Of Tobit Models Using Gibbs Sampling Output," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 128-140, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Vernon Roningen & Alexander Yeats, 1976. "Nontariff distortions of international trade: Some preliminary empirical evidence," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 112(4), pages 613-625, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Robert C. Feenstra, . "Integration Of Trade And Disintegration Of Production In The Global Economy," Department of Economics 98-06, California Davis - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. G. K. Helleiner, 1977. "The Political Economy of Canada's Tariff Structure: An Alternative Model," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 10(2), pages 318-26, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "What does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us That We Ought to Know?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1039, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Godek, Paul E, 1985. "Industry Structure and Redistribution through Trade Restrictions," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 687-703, October.
  16. Robert E. Baldwin, 1989. "Measuring Nontariff Trade Policies," NBER Working Papers 2978, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Richardson, Martin, 1993. "Endogenous protection and trade diversion," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3-4), pages 309-324, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Maggi, Giovanni & Rodriguez-Clare, Andres, 2000. "Import penetration and the politics of trade protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 287-304, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. S. Lael Brainard & Thierry Verdier, 1993. "The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited," NBER Working Papers 4606, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, 1984. "The Effects of the Tokyo Round on the Structure of Protection," NBER Chapters, in: The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy, pages 361-388 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  21. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldbe & Giovanni Maggi, 1997. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 5942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Revenga, Ana L, 1992. "Exporting Jobs? The Impact of Import Competition on Employment and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(1), pages 255-84, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, 1997. "Measurement of Non-Tariff Barriers," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 179, OECD, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  24. Phillip Swagel, 1995. "Import prices and the competing goods effect," International Finance Discussion Papers 508, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? A few items listed on IDEAS are over 2000 years old!

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.