When firms use bank oans and trade credit,bankruptcy rules can magnify aggregate fluctuations.A priori,a rule where banks are senior is not appropriate to dampen fluctuations.It might force trade creditors into bankruptcy by triggering a ‘domino e ffect ’-when firms go bust because their clients default.Yet,banks are often senior.In this paper,we characterize the conditions under which such a rule limits the likelihood of bankruptcies.We model a credit chain where in equilibrium firms use trade credit and bank loans.Due to the credit chain,bank seniority minimizes the overall risk premium charged by trade creditors and banks.Although bank seniority magni fies the domino e ffect,we find it is optimal whenever there is a relatively high proportion of bad risks
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
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Tore Ellingsen & Mike Burkart, 2002.
"In-Kind Finance,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp421, Financial Markets Group.
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