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Gatekeeping

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  • Crombez, Christophe

    (U of Leuven)

  • Groseclose, Timothy J.

    (U of California, Los Angeles)

  • Krehbiel, Keith

    (Stanford U)

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    Abstract

    Collective choice bodies throughout the world use a diverse array of codified rules that determine who may exercise procedural rights, and in what order. This paper analyzes several two-stage decision-making models, focusing on one in which the first-moving actor has a unique, unilateral, procedural right to enforce the status quo, i.e., to exercise gatekeeping. Normative analysis using Pareto-dominance criteria reveals that the institution of gatekeeping is inferior to another institutional arrangement within this framework--namely, one in which the same actor is given a traditional veto instead of a gatekeeping right. The analytical results raise an empirical puzzle: When and why would self-organizing collective choice bodies adopt gatekeeping institutions? A qualitative survey of governmental institutions suggests that--contrary to an entrenched modeling norm within political science--empirical instances of codidied gatekeeping rights are rare or nonexistent.

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    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1861R1.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1861r1.

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    Date of creation: Jul 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1861r1

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Crombez, Christophe, 1996. "Legislative procedures in the European Community," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/101051, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
    2. Huxtable, Phillip A, 1994. "Incorporating the Rules Committee: An Extension of the Ferejohn/Shipan Model," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 160-67, April.
    3. Ferejohn, John & Shipan, Charles, 1990. "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 1-20.
    4. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
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