Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers
AbstractIndirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of new capital, leading to higher future fees. We quantify the magnitude of indirect performance incentives for hedge fund managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows as lags increase up to two years. Conservative estimates indicate that indirect incentives for the average fund are four times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds, indirect incentives are seven times as large as direct incentives. Combining direct and indirect incentives, for each dollar generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the present value of future fees over the expected life of the fund. Older and capacity constrained funds have considerably weaker relations between future flows and performance, leading to weaker indirect incentives. There is no evidence that direct contractual incentives are stronger when market-based indirect incentives are weaker.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2013-06.
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
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- Lim, Jongha & Minton, Bernadette A. & Weisbach, Michael S., 2014.
"Syndicated loan spreads and the composition of the syndicate,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 45-69.
- Jongha Lim & Bernadette A. Minton & Michael Weisbach, 2012. "Syndicated Loan Spreads and the Composition of the Syndicate," NBER Working Papers 18356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lim, Jongha & Minton, Bernadette A. & Weisbach, Michael S., 2012. "Syndicated Loan Spreads and the Composition of the Syndicate," Working Paper Series 2012-15, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
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