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Tournament Behavior in Hedge Funds: High-water Marks, Fund Liquidation, and Managerial Stake

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  • George O. Aragon
  • Vikram Nanda

Abstract

We analyze whether risk shifting by a hedge fund manager is related to the manager's incentive contract, personal capital stake, and the risk of fund closure. We find that the propensity to increase risk following poor performance is significantly weaker when incentive pay is tied to the fund's high-water mark and when funds face little immediate risk of liquidation. Risk shifting is also less prevalent when a manager has a significant amount of personal capital invested in the fund. Overall, high-water mark provisions, managerial stake, and low risk of fund closure appear to make a hedge fund manager more conservative with regard to risk shifting. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • George O. Aragon & Vikram Nanda, 2012. "Tournament Behavior in Hedge Funds: High-water Marks, Fund Liquidation, and Managerial Stake," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(3), pages 937-974.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:25:y:2012:i:3:p:937-974
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    Cited by:

    1. Charles Cao & Grant Farnsworth & Hong Zhang, 2021. "The Economics of Hedge Fund Startups: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 1427-1469, June.
    2. Aiken, Adam L. & Kilic, Osman & Reid, Sean, 2016. "Can hedge funds time global equity markets? Evidence from emerging markets," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 2-11.
    3. Servaes, Henri & Sigurdsson, Kari, 2022. "The Costs and Benefits of Performance Fees in Mutual Funds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    4. Dai, Na & Nahata, Rajarishi & Brauner, Aaron, 2022. "Does individualism matter for hedge funds? A cross-country examination," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    5. Paolo Guasoni & Jan Obłój, 2016. "The Incentives Of Hedge Fund Fees And High-Water Marks," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 269-295, April.
    6. Massa, Massimo & Jiao, Yawen, 2015. "Short Selling Meets Hedge Fund 13F: An Anatomy of Informed Demand," CEPR Discussion Papers 10471, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Lan, Yingcong & Wang, Neng & Yang, Jinqiang, 2013. "The economics of hedge funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 300-323.
    8. George J. Jiang & Bing Liang & Huacheng Zhang, 2022. "Hedge Fund Manager Skill and Style-Shifting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(3), pages 2284-2307, March.
    9. Ekaterini Panopoulou & Nikolaos Voukelatos, 2022. "Should hedge funds deviate from the benchmark?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 51(3), pages 767-795, September.
    10. Adam L. Aiken & Osman Kilic & Sean Reid, 2016. "Can hedge funds time global equity markets? Evidence from emerging markets," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(1), pages 2-11, April.
    11. Gao, Lei & Wang, Ying & Zhao, Jing, 2017. "Does local religiosity affect organizational risk-taking? Evidence from the hedge fund industry," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-22.
    12. Andrew W. Lo & Mila Getmansky & Peter A. Lee, 2015. "Hedge Funds: A Dynamic Industry in Transition," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 483-577, December.
    13. Agarwal, Vikas & Ruenzi, Stefan & Weigert, Florian, 2017. "Tail risk in hedge funds: A unique view from portfolio holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 610-636.
    14. Serge Darolles & Christian Gouriéroux, 2013. "The Effects of Management and Provision Accounts on Hedge Fund Returns - Part I : The High Water Mark Scheme," Working Papers 2013-22, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    15. Li, Ying & Holland, A. Steven & Kazemi, Hossein B., 2019. "Duration of poor performance and risk shifting by hedge fund managers," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 35-47.
    16. G. Elaut & M. Frömmel & J. Sjödin, 2014. "Crystallization – the Hidden Dimension of Hedge Funds' Fee Structure," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 14/872, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    17. Jongha Lim & Berk A. Sensoy & Michael S. Weisbach, 2016. "Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(2), pages 871-918, April.
    18. Ahmadpour, Kobra & Frömmel, Michael, 2022. "The role of gender for the risk-shifting behavior of hedge fund and CTA managers," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PA).
    19. Jiao, Yawen & Massa, Massimo & Zhang, Hong, 2016. "Short selling meets hedge fund 13F: An anatomy of informed demand," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 544-567.
    20. Ewald, Christian-Oliver & Zhang, Hai, 2016. "Hedge fund seeding via fees-for-seed swaps under idiosyncratic risk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 45-59.
    21. DeVault, Luke & Turtle, H.J. & Wang, Kainan, 2021. "Blessing or curse? Institutional investment in leveraged ETFs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    22. Finer, David Andrew, 2022. "No Shock Waves through Wall Street? Market Responses to the Risk of Nuclear War," Working Papers 318, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    23. Hong, Xin & Pang, Ningjing & Wang, Zhibin, 2022. "Stop-loss early termination clause and hedge fund performance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    24. Cumming, Douglas & Dai, Na & Johan, Sofia, 2015. "Are hedge funds registered in Delaware different?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 232-246.

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