The value of benchmarking

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The value of benchmarking

Author Info

HEGE, Ulrich
BERGEMANN, Dirk (Department of Economics, Yale University)

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Abstract

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The allocation of funds is subject moral hazard. The optimal contract provides for incentive payments linked to attaining the next benchmark, which must be increasing in the funding horizon of each stage. Benchmarking reduces agency costs, directly by shortening the agent's guaranteed funding horizon, and indirectly via an implicit incentive effect of information rents in future financing rounds. The ex ante need to provide incentives and the venture capitalist's desire to cut information rents ex post create a hold-up conflict, which can be overcome by providing all funds in every stage in a single up-front payment. Empirical patterns of the evolution of financing rounds and research intensity over the lifetime of a project are explained as optimal choices: the optimal capital allocated and the funding horizon are increasing from one stage to the next. This emphasizes the notion that early stages are the riskiest in an innovative venture.

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Paper provided by Groupe HEC in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 752.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0752

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Paper
- Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, 2002. "The Value of Benchmarking," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1379, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Oct 2002. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2002-12-02 (All new papers)
NEP-CFN-2002-12-02 (Corporate Finance)
NEP-ENT-2002-12-02 (Entrepreneurship)
NEP-RMG-2002-12-02 (Risk Management)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 2001. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," CEPR Discussion Papers 2763, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, 2001. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1292R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, 2001. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1292, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- Bergemann, D. & Hege, U., 2001. "The financing of innovation : learning and stopping," Discussion Paper 16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Ulrigh Hege, 2005. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 719-752, Winter.
Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
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- Klaus M. Schmidt, 2003. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1139-1166, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
- Bergemann, D. & Hege, U., 1997. "Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning," Discussion Paper 108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
- Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 1997. "Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning," CEPR Discussion Papers 1738, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D activities," CSEF Working Papers 60, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D Activities," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-38, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
- Ambec, S. & Poitevin, M., 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D Activities," Cahiers de recherche 2001-12, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Kaplan, Steven & Strömberg, Per Johan, 2000. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets The Real World: An Empirical Analysis Of Venture Capital Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 2421, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2000. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," NBER Working Papers 7660, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2000. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," CRSP working papers 513, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
John H. Cochrane, 2001. "The Risk and Return of Venture Capital," NBER Working Papers 8066, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- John Cochrane, 2000. "The Risk and Return of Venture Capital," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1082, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
- Cochrane, John H., 2005. "The risk and return of venture capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 3-52, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Thomas Hellmann, 1998. "The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 57-76, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka & Takalo, Tuomas & Kultti, Klaus, 2006. "The role of comparing in financial markets with hidden information," Research Discussion Papers 1/2006, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
Juha-Pekka Niinimäki & Tuomas Takalo, 2007. "Benchmarking and Comparing Entrepreneurs with Incomplete Information," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Society for Economic Research, vol. 20(2), pages 91-107, Autumn. [Downloadable!]
Pierre Giot & Armin Schwienbacher, 2003. "IPOs, Trade Sales and Liquidations: Modelling Venture Capital Exits Using Survival Analysis," Finance 0312006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Giot, Pierre & Schwienbacher, Armin, 2007. "IPOs, trade sales and liquidations: Modelling venture capital exits using survival analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 679-702, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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