Can Imports Discipline Collusive Firms? Case of the Philippine Cement Industry
AbstractApplying a conjectural variations (CV) model introduced by Haskel and Scaramozzino (H&S model 1997), the paper examines the impact of trade liberalization on the Philippine cement industry where alleged cartel activities have taken place after the entry of the worlds Big Three cement firms : Holcim, Cemex, and Lafarge. In the H&S model, the relationship between firm behavior and competition is estimated with price cost margin (price minus marginal costs over price) as indicator of competition and profitability. The model is extended to assess the impact of imports on competition using import penetration ratio as proxy for trade policy. The paper focuses on the following questions : did the removal of import restriction and reduction of tariffs affect competition in the cement industry? Are imports effective in disciplining domestic firms and reducing their market power? The results imply that imports do not seem to affect profitability and competition in the industry. Given the ability of firms to engage in anticompetitive behavior and the absence of an effective competition policy in the Philippines, the gains from trade liberalization are nullified. The countrys experience in the cement industry illustrates that trade liberalization is not a substitute for competition policy. For imports to effectively discipline the market, trade liberalization must be accompanied by strict competition policy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Microeconomics Working Papers with number 22608.
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: JG Crawford Building #13, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, ACT 0200
Web page: http://www.eaber.org
More information through EDIRC
cement industry; cartel; conjectural variations; competition; Trade Liberalization;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L61 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
- O24 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Appelbaum, Elie, 1982. "The estimation of the degree of oligopoly power," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 287-299, August.
- Haskel, Jonathan & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 1995.
"Do Other Firms Matter in Oligopolies?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1194, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Appelbaum, Elie, 1979. "Testing price taking behavior," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 283-294, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shiro Armstrong).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.