Barrgh-gaining with Somali Pirates
AbstractRansoms paid to Somali pirates are drifting upward and negotiation times are increasing, yet there is huge variation in bargaining outcomes across shipowners. We use a unique dataset of 179 Somali hijackings, and an underlying theoretical model of the bargaining process based on detailed interviews with ransom negotiators, to analyze the empirical determinants of ransom amounts and negotiation lengths. We find that ransom amount and negotiation length depend on the observable characteristics of both pirates and ships and on the "reference ransom" established by previous ransom payments for a specific ship type. International naval enforcement efforts have driven up ransom amounts. We also observe a "hump-shape" in ransoms, with relatively low ransoms being paid following both short and very long negotiations, and the highest ransoms paid following intermediate length negotiations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Economics of Security Working Paper Series with number 74.
Length: 22 p.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Piracy; ransom; duration; bargaining; law enforcement; Somalia;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
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