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Droit et gouvernance:l’apport du courant comportemental

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  • Gérard Charreaux

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

Dans le cadre de l’approche dominante de la gouvernance, le rôle du droit est d’aider à réduire les conséquences des conflits d’intérêts et des comportements stratégiques intentionnels des différents acteurs, notamment des dirigeants. Les décisions des dirigeants préjudiciables aux actionnaires et aux autres parties prenantes ne relèvent cependant pas toutes d’un comportement volontaire. Certaines résultent d’erreurs de jugement, de biais cognitifs et comportementaux. Sur la base du courant Behavioral Law and Economics qui s’est fortement développé aux Etats-Unis, l’objectif de l’article est de montrer que le rôle du droit à l’intérieur du système de gouvernance est également de contribuer à « débiaiser » les décisions ou à corriger les conséquences défavorables de ces biais.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Charreaux, 2009. "Droit et gouvernance:l’apport du courant comportemental," Working Papers CREGO 1091001, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1091001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gérard Charreaux, 2011. "Quelle théorie pour la gouvernance?De la gouvernance actionnariale à la gouvernance cognitive et comportementale," Working Papers CREGO 1110402, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    biais comportemental; théorie comportementale du droit; paternalisme libertarien; théorie comportementale de la gouvernance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • K29 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Other

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