Economic Integration, Lobbying by Firms and Workers, and Technological Change
AbstractI examine a common market with the following institutions. Oligopolistic firms improve their productivity by R&D. Wages are determined by union-employer bargaining. Firms and workers lobby the authority that accepts new members and regulates unions' and firms' market power. The main findings are as follows. Small common markets have incentives to expand, but large ones are indifferent to new members. With product market deregulation, there is an upper limit for the size of the common market and the growth rate diminishes with integration.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade in its series DEGIT Conference Papers with number c013_003.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
economic integration; labor unions; market power; endogenous technological change;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
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