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A Refined Bargaining Set of an n-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation

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Author Info
Lin Zhou (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

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Abstract

The two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are: When a game is played, what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen? No previous solution concepts or theories in the literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions; answers are especially lacking for the first one. In this paper we introduce the refined bargaining set, which is the first solution concept in cooperative game theory that simultaneously provides answers to both of the fundamental questions.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p08b/p0868.pdf
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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d09b/d0974.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 974.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Apr 1991
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Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (1994), 6: 512-526
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:974

Note: CFP 868.
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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
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Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Cooperative games; game theory; bargaining coalition;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Vohra, Rajiv, 1991. "An existence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 19-34. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Boehm, Volker, 1974. "The Core of an Economy with Production," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(3), pages 429-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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